Both the effectiveness of centralisation efforts and the nature of the interactions between the local and national levels are influenced by the distribution of power between these two levels of administration – two components are institutional set-up and the strength of the respective political mandate (Fig. x). Based on the example of these four countries, we found that in countries with more decentralised administrations (Poland, Czechia) the local level is more likely to resist centralisation attempts than in countries where local governments already have relatively fewer functions and resources (Romania, Hungary). Moreover, in Romania and Hungary municipalities attempt to represent their interests through partisan channels and actors try to secure better positions for their own cities, with the individual bargaining strategies further increasing the leverage of the national level and often leading to clientelistic relations. In contrast, in Poland and Czechia, local actors represent their interests publicly and collectively, often through unions, associations or other alliances. The success of political action (be it collective or individual lobbying) however is highly dependent on the concentration of political power. It is reasonable to expect that in countries, where national governments have a strong political mandate and authority is used in a more hegemonic way (Poland, Hungary) it will be more difficult to resist centralisation in times of crisis than in countries with more diffuse political power-structure (Czechia, Romania). 

The Czech Republic and Poland are similarly decentralised states with significant competences and resources delegated to the local level and supported by sufficient constitutional safeguards. However, the differences in the political mandate can explain the different situation local governance faces in these two countries. In Poland, a unified and centralised party has governed with a sufficient legislative majority since 2015 and already managed to erode local autonomy significantly. Hungary provides the worst-practice blueprint for what would happen in case constitutional majority is attained by PiS. Nonetheless, local actors still have the means and the public support to fight back occasionally and challenge the government in certain policy areas. In contrast, Czechia has had a minority government during the first half of the crisis and even the current coalition is constituted of highly diverse parties. Taking into consideration, that mayors may hold position in the national legislation and that the local level has a direct political representation in the government in the form of Mayors and Independents (STAN), it is not hard to see that local level has the most room to manoeuvre in the Czech Republic out of the four observed countries – both in institutional and political terms. This set-up makes it practically impossible for any (coalition) government to successfully attempt to centralise resources and competences from the local level, as opposed to Poland, where actors are engaged in a fierce struggle over municipal autonomy. 

The nature of the interaction between the local and national level is probably best highlighted by the differences between the Czech and Romanian cases. Both countries have had fairly fragmented governments with relatively fragile legislative bases. But where Czech municipalities are able to build on a strong, secure institutional, formal setting and this results in collective action and political representation, Romanian municipalities lack such resources in a centralised state and rely on informal linkages and individual bargaining strategies. The relationship between the central and local government becomes two-way and transactional with both sides having to gain from a partnership, as the national level hopes for political support and legitimacy “on the ground” from locally relevant actors, and both sides avoid a confrontational approach to negotiations, thus making the issue of local autonomy absent from the political agenda in elections. More nuance can be added to the observation by comparing the Hungarian and Romanian cases, where both countries operate a more centralised administration, and both countries have a significant share of decision-making happening in informal settings. However, in Romania, the central government stands to gain something from a transactional approach, as opposed to Hungary, where informal power is exercised through command-and-control and blackmail-style relations (depending on the party standing of any given mayor) between the national and local level. This mostly results in a situation where government-affiliated municipalities may engage in a similarly competitive, clientelistic lobbying as their Romanian counterparts, while opposition-led cities submit to the idea that they will have to make do in a hostile environment. 

Our assessment highlights the relevance of the institutional set-up and division of administrative responsibilities in determining the effectiveness of challenging the central authority. In a more decentralised system actors are more likely to resist and utilise all the available political and legal tools to maintain autonomy, while lack of formal safeguards of independent local administration actors will rely more on obscure informal, clientelistic linkages significantly more prone to corruption and inefficient public service provision.