Regional Report
Annex
1. Local democracy data
| CZECHIA | HUNGARY | POLAND | ROMANIA | |
| Democracy score (Freedom House, 2021) % | 76 | 45 | 60 | 57 |
| Local Democratic Governance rating (Freedom House, 2021) (1-7) | 6.00 | 4.25 | 5.50 | 4.50 |
| Election (national/local) held during the pandemic | yes (2021) | no (2022) | no (2019) | yes (2020, postponed) |
| Upcoming local election (year) | 2026 | 2024 | 2024 (postponed) | 2024 |
| Turnout at the last two local elections | 46.07% (2022) 47.34% (2018) | 48.58% (2019) 44.3% (2014) | 54.90% (2018) 47.40% (2014) | 46.62% (2020) 48.17% (2016) |
| Trust in local authorities (2020 October) | 47% | 39% | 48% | 35% |
Local Autonomy Index (2014, Keuffer-Ladner) | 64.9 | 50.8 | 74.1 | 58.1 |
| Decentralisation index (Committee of Regions, 2023) (0-3, EU rank) | 1.9, 9/27 | 1.4, 21/27 | 1.9, 8/27 | 1.4, 20/27 |
2. Factors of resilience / vulnerability during the Covid-19 pandemic
Answers were provided based on project partners evaluation.
| CZECHIA | HUNGARY | POLAND | ROMANIA | |
| Municipalities have revenue from shared PIT / VAT taxes. | yes | no | yes | yes |
| Dual mandate is allowed for local representatives (mayors can be MPs). | yes | no | no | no |
| Effective constitutional protection of municipal property | yes | no | yes | yes |
| Deconcentration of public administrative tasks delegated to the municipalities to an extensive extent. | yes | no | yes | no |
| Regions have sufficient competences, revenues, legal connections with municipalities and administrative capacity to carry out development tasks autonomously. | yes | no | yes | no |
| Earmarked transfers to local governments become part of the disposable budget. | yes | no | yes | yes |
| Local governments are allowed to borrow money through a transparent (rule-based), non-politicized mechanism (eg. independent supervisory body). | yes | no | yes | yes |
| Horizontal fiscal equalisation mechanism between local government units (eg. ‘solidarity tax’) that is transparent and accepted as legitimate by LGs. | yes | no | yes | yes |
| Local governments could maintain their ability to absorb external stress due to their capacity to adjust their revenues (taxing powers, scale of fees). | yes | no | no | no |
| Official aggregate sectoral level data is available for the public to monitor the ‘scissors effect’ (diminishing revenues, increasing expenditures) in municipal finances | yes | no | yes | yes |
| In general, the pre-pandemic financial condition (fiscal health) of the municipal sector was stable (i.e. no mass indebtedness, waves of bankruptcies, growing operating deficits). | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Compensation for pandemic-related losses for LGs in a politically unbiased and fair manner. | yes | no | no | no |
| Extraordinary law-making powers were not abused to make decisions on municipal matters. | yes | no | yes | yes |
| Local governments or their associations were consulted when restrictive measures were being adopted in handling the public health crisis, and designing the recovery plans. | no | no | no | no |
| Municipal councils could hold their meetings and make decisions during the pandemic period (offline or online). | yes | no | yes | yes |
| Rules protecting FOI and transparency stayed in place amidst the regulatory changes during the pandemic. | yes | no | no | no |
| Municipalities received accurate and up-to-date data on number of cases, patients treated in hospitals, number of fatalities. | yes | no | no | yes |